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Why the Intentional Sexual Transmission of Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) Should Be
Criminalized Through the Use of Specific HIV
Criminal Statutes
INTRODUCTION
Most people agree that the intentional sexual transmission of the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) is wrong.' This type of
transmission occurs when an HIV infected person has consensual sexual
intercourse2 with an uninfected person without informing them of the
presence of the virus. Some people feel criminalization of the intentional
sexual transmission of HIV is necessary as a matter of public policy to
control the spread of the virus3 while others feel that the criminal law is
an ineffective and inappropriate means of controlling the spread of HIV.
However, federal legislation requires that the States enact HIV legislation
in order to obtain HIV funding.5 Therefore, there is no question of
whether the States should legislate on HIV transmissions The question
is simply how.
Many States have public health laws making it a crime to
intentionally transmit a sexually transmitted disease (STD) to another
' See Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers, Public
Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 Oo110 ST. L.J. 1017, 1019, 1044 (1989) (reporting that public
opinion polls indicated that the public felt that coercive action must be used by the state to
prevent HIV infected persons from spreading the virus sexually and also that the intentional
sexual transmission of HIV is "blameworthy"); see also Dan Subotnik, "Sue Me, Sue Me,
What Can You Do Me? I Love You" A Disquisition on Law, Sex, and Talk, 47 FLA. L. REv.
311, 409 (1995) (indicating that 84% of the people surveyed believed that the law should
provide for penalties when a sexual partner misrepresents the fact that he or she has HIV or
another STD).
2 Sexual intercourse includes anal, oral and vaginal intercourse. Gostin, supra
note 1, at 1021-22:
3 Id. at 1038 (upholding that criminalization sanctions blameworthy people for
their acts while providing retribution and prevention of future acts).
4 Id. at 1044 (arguing that the transmission of a virus does not fit into the
criminal law profile of a guilty offender and an innocent victim).
' The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990,
Pub.L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amending
the Public Health Service Act of 1970) (hereinafter "CARE").
6 If the States do not enact legislation, they do not receive the much needed
funding from the federal government. Id.
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person.7 However, these laws are rarely enforced' Also, most States do
not include HIV on their list of sexually transmitted diseases.9 Another
alternative to using public health laws to punish the intentional sexual
transmission of an STD or HIV is to use traditional criminal statutes to
punish offenders who knowingly transmit either an STD or HIV.' °
However, these laws are not specifically tailored for this purpose, and as
a result, are an undesirable means of prosecution." A final and more
desirable alternative is the enactment of laws specifically targeted to the
intentional sexual transmission of HIV.12 Although there has not been a
U.S. Supreme Court determination on the constitutionality of specific
HIV laws, 3 other Supreme Court decisions indicate that these laws
would be found valid.' 4
This Note focuses on the need for enactment and enforcement of
'E.g. Stephen V. Kenney, Comment, Criminalizing HIV Transmission: Lessons
From History and a Model for the Future, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 245, 247
(1992) (noting that the public health laws were enacted over 100 years ago to combat the
spread of syphilis).
'Id. at 256.
91d.
" See Karen E. Lahey, The New Line of Defense: Criminal HIV Transmission
Laws, I SYRACUSE J. LEGISLATION & POLICY 85, 86-88 (1995).
" Id. (noting that the prosecution of individuals under traditional criminal law
statutes presents problems such as difficulty proving causation due to the latency period of
HIV and difficulty in proving actual transmission since the virus is not transmitted easily).
See also Michael L. Closen et al., Criminalization of an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and Criminal
Exposure Laws, 46 ARK. L. REV. 921 (1994) (suggesting that traditional criminal law is not
an appropriate route).
2 See generally, Lahey, supra note 10 (advocating that HIV statutes would
deter further transmission of HIV); Linda K. Burdt and Robert S. Calwell, The Real Fatal
Attraction: Civil and Criminal Liability for the Sexual Transmission ofAIDS, 37 DRAKE L.
REV. 657 (1987/1988) (proposing need for HIV-specific statutes is warranted to keep HIV
from continuing to spread in the decades ahead); Amy M. Decker, Comment, Criminalizing
the Intentional or Reckless Exposure to HIV: A Wake-Up Call to Kansas, 46 U. KAN. L.
REV. 333 (1998) (advocating the need for HIV-specific felony statutes to easily enable
prosecution of offenders).
13 See Kenney, supra note 7, at 262-63.
" See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II (1905) (allowing States
broad discretion to enact public health laws to proteci public health and safety); Love v.
Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1990) (upholding a mandatory HIV testing statute to
protect public health).
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specific laws criminalizing the intentional sexual transmission of HIV
since the incidence of HIV is still increasing at epidemic proportions.
Section I provides background information on the history of HIV.
Section II discusses legislation relating to HIV including the Ryan White
Comprehensive AIDS Emergency (CARE) Act; current public health
laws governing the intentional sexual transmission of STDs, and the
application of traditional criminal laws to the transmission of HIV and
why this is also not an effective means to legislate regarding HIV
transmission. Section III discusses how STD laws can be used as a
framework for HIV laws, the similarities between HIV and syphilis, and
the proposition that controlling the spread of STD's would help control
HIV. Section IV advocates that specific HIV laws criminalizing the
intentional sexual transmission if HIV are the superior method to control
the spread of HIV, with emphasis on foreseeability and the duty to warn.
Section V discusses when knowledge of HIV should be imputed on a
person that does not have actual knowledge they are infected and
discusses both the Rock Hudson and Magic Johnson cases. Section VI
discusses two incidences of "supertransmitters" which exemplify why
HIV-specific laws are needed. Section VII discusses the constitutionality
of specific HIV laws in light of its review of STD laws and other related
issues. This Note concludes with the assertion that specific criminal laws
are needed and are proper in light of public policy and constitutional
requirements.
I. BACKGROUND OF HIV, ILLUSTRATING THAT SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IS
THE PRIMARY MEANS OF TRANSMISSION
Since the early 1980's when HIV was first identified 5 HIV has
spread dramatically within the United States. 6 HIV attacks a person's
'" See Thomas W. Tierney, Note, Criminalizing the Sexual Transmission of
HIV: An International Analysis, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 475, 476 (1992). See
also Linda K. Burdt & Robert S. Caldwell, Note, The Real Fatal Attraction: Civil and
Criminal Liability for the Sexual Transmission ofAIDS, 37 DRAKE L. REv. 657 (1987/1988)
(stating that HIV was first identified in 1981).
16 Paul Barron et al., Survey, State Statutes Dealing with HIV and AIDS: A
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immune system, 7 and is transmitted by one of three means: infected
blood injected into the bloodstream, unprotected sex with an infected
person, and passing from an infected mother to her unborn or newborn
baby. 8 However, the most common means of transmission of the HIV
virus is through sexual activity 9 Sexual activity includes oral, anal, and
vaginal sex, with anal sex posing the most serious risk and oral sex the
least risk. ° As of June 1997, there were 79,512 reported cases of HIV
infection in the United States 2' and 222,704 reported cases of Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 22 with the highest rates of
infection in New York, California, and Florida, respectively.3
AIDS refers to the illness a person develops afterbeing infected
with, and having their immune system attacked by, HIV.24 HIV may
remain dormant in the body from two months to seven years after initial
infection. 25 During this time the only way a person can detect infection
is to be tested for the presence of antibodies to the virus.26 This test
would indicate exposure to HIV within two to four months.27
Comprehensive State-By-State Summary, 5 LAW & SEX. 1 (1995) (asserting that "Since the
early 1980's, the spread of AIDS and the number of persons diagnosed as HIV positive has
been dramatic.").
7 Tierney, supra note 15, at 476.
I81d.
19 See id. at 482 (indicating that "HIV infection is primarily a sexually
transmitted disease."). See also Gostin, supra note 1, at 1044 (indicating that "sexual
intercourse is a primary mode of transmission of HIV.").
2 Tiemey, supra note 15, at 482 (reporting that anal and vaginal sex are the
most effective modes of transmission while oral sex is the least effective transmission route).
21 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE
SURVEILLANCE, (1996) (visited February 26, 1998) <http://www.wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/
STD/STD/STDD 101 >.
22 Id.
23 id.
24 Tierney, supra note 15, at 476-77 (noting that the term 'AIDS' was defined
by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Georgia).
25 This period is known as either the latency period or the dormancy period. Id.
at 478-79.
26 A positive HIV test result is the only way to detect infection during this
period. Id. at 479.
27 Tierney, supra note 15, at 479 (indicating that the antibodies usually become
detectable two to four months after exposure to the HIV virus). Within six months of
exposure, 95% of infected individuals yield a positive test result. Id.
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II. LEGISLATION
A. The Ryan White Act and the Need to Legislate
The Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency
(CARE) Act of 199028 was a catalyst which sparked legislative action to
provide a means to prosecute for the intentional transmission of HIV.
29
This Federal Act provides emergency AIDS relief grants if a State has
statutes which allow a person to be prosecuted for intentionally
transmitting HIV to another person." The States can fulfill this federal
requirement by: amending their public health statutes to include HIV on
their list of sexually transmitted diseases;3" using traditional criminal law
statutes to punish HIV transmission;3 2 or enacting specific criminal
statutes targeted at HIV transmission
B. Current Public Health Laws Addressing STDs
Generally, public health laws impose a duty upon a person who
is infected with an STD to warn a sexual partner of infection before
sexual contact.34 For example, New York's Public Health Law provides
2 See CARE, supra note 5.
29 Kenney, supra note 7, at 247.
31 Id. at 247. CARE provides emergency assistance to geographical areas that
are disproportionately affected by the HIV epidemic. This act makes financial assistance
available to States, as well as public and private non-profit entities to fund the development
and operation of programs to deliver the essential services to individuals infected with HIV.
42 U.S.C. § 300ff.
3' Kenney, supra note 7, at 263, 266-68 (advocating that grouping HIV with
other STDs is inappropriate).
32 Id. at 263-64 (noting the shortcomings of applying these general criminal
statutes to HIV).
" Id. at 263, 268-72 (asserting that "The AIDS-specific statute appears to be the
best method to establish a coercive public health response to control the spread of HIV
infection.").
3" Eric L. Schulman, Note, Sleeping with the Enemy: Combating the Sexual
Spread of HIV-AIDS Through a Heightened Legal Duty, 29 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 957, 973
(1996).
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that "[a]ny person who, knowing himself or herself to be infected with
an infectious venereal disease, has sexual intercourse with another shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor."35 However, New York does not include
HIV/AIDS on its list of sexually transmitted diseases.36 In February
1988, four medical societies petitioned the New York Commissioner of
Health to include HIV as a communicable disease and place it on the list
of sexually transmitted diseases 7 Since this "would trigger the operation
of statutes providing for isolation and quarantine, reporting, testing and
contact testing ' 38 for HIV, the Commissioner denied the request stating
that the statutes triggered "would be inappropriate for AIDS or HIV-
infected patients., 39  The New York Supreme Court held that the
Commissioner was justified in his decision and the Appellate Division
affirmed.4 °
Case law states that a person has a duty to warn a sexual partner
of the presence of an STD.4 Case law also proclaims that this duty is not
limited to the cases of misrepresentations of the presence of an STI 2 or
15 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1993).
36 N.Y. COWi. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 23.1. The list includes gonorrhea,
syphilis, non-gonococcal urethritis (NGU), non-gonococcal (mucopurulent) cervicitis,
trichomoniasis, genital herpes simplex, PID gonococcal/non-gonococcal, lymphogranuloma
venereum, chancroid, ano-genital warts, granuloma inguinale, yeast vaginitis, gardnerella
vaginitis, pediulosis pubis, scabies. Id.
"7 New York State Society of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 555 N.Y.S.2d 911 (App.
Div. 1990).
39 Id. at 912.
31 Id. (reasoning that the voluntary cooperation of HIV infected individuals
might be lost as well as confidentiality if HIV was added to the statute).
40 The New York State Supreme Court dismissed the New York Society of
Surgeons' petition on the merits and the Appellate Division concluded that the
Commissioner of Health of the State of New York did not exceed his authority or act
arbitrarily or capricious when he determined that HIV infection would not be designated as
a communicable or sexually transmitted disease. Id. at 912-13.
41 See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1989) (allowing an action
for transmission of genital herpes); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App.
1984) (allowing an action for failure to inform plaintiff of the presence of an STD).
41 See Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (App. Div. 1986)
(agreeing with lower court statements that, "the thirty-one year marital relationship gave rise
to an affirmative 'legal duty to speak,' and the allegation that the husband failed to disclose
his condition adequately States a cause of action for constructive, if not actual, fraud."). The
court also found that the duty to speak could be predicated' on New York's Public Health
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instances where there is a confidential or special relationship such as
marriage or engagement 3 Since "courts impose a duty to disclose non-
life-threatening STDs before engaging in sex,' 4 it seems that they should
also impose the same duty on life-threatening STDs such as HIV. In the
late 1900's, States began to use their police powet 5 to contain the spread
of many different contagious diseases through the use of quarantine,
vaccination, and mandatory physical examinations, as well as through
public health statutes which criminalized behavior risking transmission
of an STD. 6 Although the States could now prosecute for behavior
which risked transmission of an STD, the public health statutes
criminalizing transmission of an STD were rarely enforced.47 This may
Law § 2307, which makes it a misdemeanor for a person with an STD to have sex with
another person, in finding this duty to warn. Id.
43 See B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988) (holding that the defendant did
not need to have a confidential relationship with the plaintiff before he owed her the duty to
disclose that he had genital herpes). The defendant had a general duty to disclose and it was
sufficient that the defendant should have known that harm to the plaintiff was likely. Id.
Their relationship was merely a romantic one between a doctor and a nurse, not a
confidential one. Id.
" See A. Samuel Oddi, Reverse Informed Consent: The Unreasonable
Dangerously Patient, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1455 (1993).
4' The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend X, § 10.
Courts have never clearly defined what the police power of the States is. Stone v.
Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1880). "Many attempts have been made by this Court and
elsewhere to define the police power, but never with entire success." Id.
46 Kenney, supra note 7, at 254-55 (explaining that the States used their police
power to control the spread of STDs primarily from the late nineteenth century through
World War II). See also David P.T. Price, Between Scylla And Charybdis: Charting a
Course to Reconcile the Duty of Confidentiality and the Duty to Warn in the AIDS Context,
94 DICK. L. REV. 435, 444 (1990) (indicating that the traditional methods of controlling
disease was primarily quarantining and segregating individuals infected with contagious
diseases). The first reported quarantining in the United States was in New York in 1622
because of smallpox. Id. Quarantine is used when a person has been exposed to a disease
but has not developed symptoms and segregation is used when a person actually has the
symptoms of a disease. Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic
Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REv. 53, 56 (1985).
47 Kenney, supra note 7, at 254-56 (noting that the statutes were mainly
enforced against prostitutes). These statutes implicitly criminalized transmission of an STD.
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1985) (providing that it is a
602 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XV
be explained due to the fact that enforcement was difficult and the
statutes only provided for minor penalties." Since coercive solutions
alone were not enough to control the spread ofSTDs,49 this suggests that
education to control disease and encourage the availability of information
and treatment 50 was a necessary addition to traditional public health
efforts.5
Public health laws governing the transmission of sexually
transmitted diseases may initially seem narrow enoughto adequately
impose liability for the intentional sexual transmission of HIV.52
However, the statutes would actually become over inclusive if HIVwas
added to them because they may criminalize some casual contacts which
pose no risk of transmitting HIV.53  This results in the public health
statutes failing the standard of reasonableness defined byJacobson v.
Massachusetts" and therefore may infringe on the right to privacy given
misdemeanor for a person who is infected with an STD to expose another); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 3198 (West 1990) (making it a misdemeanor for a person who is infected
with an STD to knowingly expose another); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-4-401(2) (1989)
(providing that it is a crime for a person, who knows, or reasonably should know, that they
are infected with an STD to willfully expose or infect another with an STD, or to perform
an act which exposes or infects another); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1106 (1982) (making it
a misdemeanor for a person who knowingly is infected with a contagious STD to engage in
sexual intercourse).
4 Kenney, supra note 7, at 256.
'49 Id. (suggesting that programs encouraging information and treatment were
needed in addition to coercive solutions).
50 "[A] comprehensive program of public education that emphasized prevention,
recognition of symptoms, and treatment for infection" is needed to reduce the spread of
STDs. Id.
"' Price, supra note 46, at 444 (indicating that the traditional methods to control
disease, included quarantine, mandatory testing and reporting, and enforcement of criminal
law).
52 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 1991) (criminalizing any
action by a person which is likely to cause another to be infected with HIV); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §384.24 (West 1991) (including HIV and AIDS to the general STD statute and
prohibiting infected persons from engaging in sexual intercourse without informing their
partners).
53 Kenney, supra note 7, at 266. But see Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A.
Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the State, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 139 (1988)
(asserting that public health statutes which include HIV are under-inclusive because they do
not account for other modes of transmission for HIV not associated with other STD's).
14 197 U.S. 11.
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by the United States Constitution." Another problem is that the public
health statutes sometimes fail to define what it is to "expose" someone to
infection.56 Courts have also dismissed many cases because of the
difficulties involved in proving the requisite intent to transmit HIV."
Further, the extremely lenient penalties imposed upon violators are
insignificant in relation to the results that may arise from the intentional
transmission of HIV." Since HIV differs from STDs in that it is
incurable, it demands a more severe penalty to adequately deter risky
behavior than those penalties given to curable STDs 9 Therefore, it
35 Kenney, supra note 7, at 266. This happens under Jacobson because,
although the Court states that the legislation must be reasonable to restrict personal
autonomy and does not have to substantiate those measures from a medical standpoint, the
Court goes on to note that the legislation must be reasonable "according to the common
belief of the people." 197 U.S. at 34-35. The constitutional right to privacy has been held
to include areas involving personal autonomy and intimate contact relating to access to birth
control, procreation, and abortion by requiring strict scrutiny of any State law which may
infringe on these privacy interests. The Supreme Court has never held that sexual
intercourse is included within the right to privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(holding the right of a woman to choose to have an abortion within the first trimester of
pregnancy is a constitutionally protected privacy right); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (holding that unmarried persons have the right to possess contraceptives); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a married persons use of contraceptives
is a privacy right protected by the Constitution). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) (holding that there is no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
56 Alabama law vaguely makes "unlawful the knowing transmission, assumption
of the risk of transmission, or performance of any act which will probably or likely transmit
a sexually transmitted disease." ALA. CODE § 22-1 IA-21 (1990). Oklahoma law makes
"unlawful the engagement by a person in any activity with the intent to infect or to cause to
be infected another person with HIV." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1192.1 (West 1991).
These statutes "fail to specify to prescribed acts or to define 'exposure'." Kenney, supra
note 7, at 266.
" Kenney, supra note 7, at 267. A study showed that due to the difficulty of
proving the requisite intent to transmit HIV, courts dismissed the majority of cases brought
under public health statutes. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Strategies for
Confronting AIDS, 261 JAMA 1621, 1627 (1989).
58 Lenient penalties are usually imposed for minor crimes such as
misdemeanors. See Sullivan & Field, supra note 53, at 171; but see LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14:43.5 (West 1991) (providing for a maximum fine of up to $5000 dollars or a maximum
prison term of ten years for the intentional exposure of a person to HIV).
59 Kenney, supra note 7, at 266-67. Kenney states that "classification of the
proscribed act as a felony would be more appropriate." Id at 267, n. 140.
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seems reasonable to conclude that grouping incurable HIV together with
curable STDs under the existing public health statues does not adequately
fulfill the objective of controlling the intentional sexual transmission of
HIV.6
0
C. Traditional Criminal Law Statutes and HIV
Although traditional criminal law statutes seem to reasonably
serve the criminal law objectives of punishment and deterrence,6' they
fall short in other areas when applied to the transmission of HIV. 2 One
such instance is the difficulty there would be to prove the requisite intent
of most traditional criminal law statutes.63 Another instance is when
persons are harshly prosecuted for conduct, which is an extremely
unlikely mode of transmission, because there is a slight risk of HIV
transmission. 64 For example, cases involving spitting or biting another
person which are not likely means of transmitting HIV may provide
harsh penalties for such acts under assault statutes.65 These penalties are
not appropriate for acts which "may not be criminal in the absence of
AIDS"66 and, therefore, do not properly reflect the adequate
60 Id. at 267.
61 Kenney, supra note 7, at 263 (analogizing that since the harm inflicted from
the transmission of HIV is similar to that of other criminal behavior, punishment and
deterrence would be served by enforcement of these laws when applied to HIV as well).
62 Id. at 267; see also Price, supra note 46, at 447 (advocating that a specific
statute would avoid many of the problems of using traditional criminal statutes).
63 It would be extremely difficult to prove the state of mind required to
purposefully or knowingly infect another with HIV because the likelihood of transmission
of HIV to another person as the result of a single sexual encounter is unknown and estimated
to be minimal. Gerald H. Friedland & Robert S. Klein, Transmission of the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED 1125, 1125-29 (1987); see also Gostin,
supra note I, at 1022 (citing research which estimates the risk of contracting HIV from a
single sexual encounter at 1/1000).
6' Kenney, supra note 7, at 267 (noting that unlikely modes of HIV transmission
include an infected person spitting or biting another person).
65 Id. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211. I(a) (1962) provides that "a person is guilty
of assault if he attempts to cause or... causes bodily injury to another[.]" Although biting
meets the definition of bodily injury which includes physical pain, illness, or impairment of
physical condition, spitting probably does not. Id. at 267, n. 146.
"Kenney, supra note 7, at 267.
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punishment.67 Further, an additional problem to the use of traditional
criminal statutes is the issue of consent.68 Under the Model Penal Code,
the defense of consent may be utilized under circumstances when the
resulting injury is reasonably foreseeable. 69 However, consent to sexual
intercourse does not mean that a person is consenting to possible
infliction of bodily injury such as the infection of HIV.7 ° Since the
Model Penal Code does not allow a person to consent to illegal
activities,71 the defense of consent may only be asserted if the person is
warned of the risk of HIV transmission and adequate precautions to
prevent transmission are taken.72 This results in statutes criminalizing
risks which a person chooses to take since most acts are consensual.73
Specifically providing for informed consent as a defense in HIV
transmission statutes would eliminate the disincentive for HIV infected
persons to determine their HIV status and likewise promote the use of
condoms, thereby discouraging risky behavior.74 Thiscan be provided
for most efficiently in HIV-specific statutes.
75
III. How STD LAWS CAN BE USED AS A FRAMEWORK FOR HIV LAWS
The laws governing the intentional sexual transmission ofan
STD provide a good framework for possible HIV transmission laws.76
Courts have held that a person has a general duty to disclose the
67 Id.
68 id.
69 Id..
70 Id. at 268.
71 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11 (2)(b) (1962).
72 Id. at 268 (indicating that condom use would always be required to provide
some protection from the possible chance of infection).
73 Kenney, supra note 7, at 268 & n. 151 (noting that acts which are not
consensual (i.e. rape) are already adequately covered by criminal law).
74 Id. at 268.
" See Gene Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the Criminal Law, 7 ST. Louis
U. PuB. L. REv. 65, 107 (1988) (noting that HIV-specific statutes which allow for informed
consent would work most effectively).
76 Schulman, supra note 34, at 972, 973 (analogizing the similarities between
the transmission of STDs and HIV).
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presence of an STD, such as genital herpes, to a sexual partner and that
the duty arises merely if the person knows or should know that the
conduct is likely to cause harm to their sexual partner."
The general rule is that one who knows, or should know,
that he or she is infected with an STD, has a duty to
either abstain from sexual contact with others, or at least
warn a sexual partner of the infection prior to sexual
contact. The rationale behind such a duty to warn is that
persons who have dangerous and contagious diseases
have an obligation to protect others with whom they have
an intimate sexual relationship and who would be in
danger of infection."8
Therefore, since courts impose this duty to warn when the
disease in question is non-life threatening 79 it follows that a similar duty
should be imposed to life threatening diseases such as HIV since the
means of transmission are similar.8"
A. Syphilis and HIV
There are similarities between syphilis,an STD, and HIV which
make a useful comparison to assess the effectiveness of the imposition of
criminal liability for the intentional sexual transmission of HIV."'
Syphilis and HIV are similar in that they both: have been epidemicspan
be sexually transmitted; have long latency periods; have serious
7 B.N., 538 A.2d at 1175.
7 See Schulman, supra note 34, at 974; see also Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d
686 (Ala. 1989) (dealing with transmission of genital herpes); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d
103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (dealing with transmission of genital herpes).
79 See Oddi, supra, note 44, at 1455. See, e.g., Berner, 543 So.2d 686
(imposing a duty to warn partner of genital herpes infection); Kathleen K., 198 Cal. Rptr.
273 (imposing a duty to warn plaintiff of the presence of an STD).
" Both STDs and HIV are primarily transmitted sexually. Schulman, supra,
note 34, at 975.
" Kenney, supra note 7, at 248. This comparison is useful to assess the
effectiveness of "imposing criminal liability on acts that risk HIV transmission" since the
modes of transmission of syphilis and HIV are similar as well as the "common sociological
and public health consequences" infection imposes. Id.
606 [Vol. XV
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pathological consequences; and created public fear and outcry.2 Further,
both diseases are primarily spread through sexual contact. 3 However,
the major difference between the two is that syphilis is now curable while
HIV is not.84 A prevalent way the spread of STDs, such as syphilis, was
controlled was through the enactment of public health laws. 5
B. Controlling STDs to Control HIV
There is also evidence which indicates that controlling the spread
of STDs would also help control the spread of HIV 86 Studies show that
a person who has both HIV and an STD is two to five times more likely
to transmit HIV to a sexual partner. 7 This trend is clearly exemplified
by examining the rates of infection in the Southern United States. This
area has the highest syphilis and gonorrhea rates, as well as the highest
rates of HIV among women of child-bearing age, in the entire country 9
Further, a study released in June, 1997 by researchers at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill indicated that men who had both HIV
as well as any other STD transmitted HIV eight to ten times more often
than men who just had HIV? ° The reason for this seems to be that HIV
" Kenney, supra note 7, at 249 (comparing the similarities between syphilis and
HIV and noting that: syphilis infected 10% of the population while AIDS accounted for 9%
of the total mortality rate; syphilis can have a latency period of up to 6 years while the
latency period of HIV is estimated to be around 7.8 years; and the fear and hysteria produced
by both syphilis and AIDS emanate from the inability of medicine to provide effective
treatment or a cure for the disease).
s3 Id. at 250.
4 Id. (suggesting that this also "highlights the fallacious use of public health
measures as a short term remedy prior to the discovery of a curative treatment).
" Id. at 253 (noting the States were able to and very frequently did legislate
using the police power given to them by the Tenth Amendment United States Constitution).
$6 See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
8' Kristina Sauerwein, Health Officials Suspect There are More Like 'Boss Man'
- The Costs of Sexually Transmitted Diseases, ST. LoUIs POST-DISPATCH, July 6, 1997, at 8A
(citing studies conducted by the "disease agency" and researchers at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill).
"$ The South, which as of 1997 had the highest rates of certain STDs, also had
the highest rate of HIV among child bearing women. Id.
89 Id.
9 Id.
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flourishes in the sores and inflammations which are typically caused by
an STD.9 Therefore, "scientists say, people who have an STD and have
sex with an HIV positive person are at a greater risk for getting the AIDS
virus."92 Other studies have shown that when STD's are found and
treated, HIV transmission rates are reduced by 40 percent.93 Joel
Greenspan, an epidemiologist, indicates that there is "a weakness in the
community's HIV and STD prevention" when HIV spreads in epidemic
proportions.94 This indicates that while HIV laws are indeed needed to
control the spread of HIV, something must also be done to control the
spread of other STDs, given the research indicating the link between the
presence of STDs and the increased likelihood of transmission of HIV.
Even though the United States has made some progress in the
prevertion of STDs, the rates of STDs in other industrialized countries
are still proportionally 50 -100 times lower than in the United States.95
This statistic suggests that current STD laws criminalizing the
transmission of STDs should be enforced as an additional way to help
control the spread of HIV. Helene Gayle, a representative from the U.S.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for HIV,
STD and TB (tuberculosis) Prevention, supports this position:
STDs also play an important role in the sexual
transmission of HIV infection. HIV clearly walks in the
footsteps of other STDs. The behaviors that put people
at risk for HIV also place them at risk for over 20 other
diseases that can be transmitted sexually. And we have
strong scientific evidence that other STDs increase the
likelihood of both becoming infected with HIV and of
transmitting HIV infection to others. Our challenge is to
91 Id.
92 Sauerwein, supra note 87, at 8A (noting that the "AIDS virus thrives in
inflammations and sores caused by an STD").
93 Id.
"Id. Greenspan was referring to Damell McGee who spread HIV in epidemic
proportions in St. Louis, Missouri.
" Sexually Transmitted Disease Status of STDs in the United States, AIDS
WKLY., Feb. 10, 1997, at 33 (hereinafter "Status"). Most other industrialized countries both
provide for and enforce STD transmission laws.
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create a synergy between approaches to STD and HIV
prevention that will break these deadly ties and bring
both epidemics under control. Behavior change
approaches that have proven effective in HIV prevention
should be applied to prevent all STDs, and STD
treatment must clearly play a key role in HIV prevention.
The challenge will be for communities to strengthen
both approaches with limited resources.
96
IV. SPECIFIC HIV LAWS
The United States Government has been trying to control the
spread of HIV through criminalization of HIV exposure as well as
through education and the imposition of civil liability. 97 Since sexual
intercourse is the most common means of transmitting HIV,98 statutes
targeted at criminalizing the intentional sexual transmission of HIV may
fulfill the criminal objectives of punishment and deterrence, as well as the
social objectives of prevention, education, and reinforcement of the
norms of social behavior.99 To effectuate these objectives, the laws
enacted must be "clearly drawn and narrowly tailored to proscribe only
the behavior that has epidemiologically been demonstrated to transmit
HIV' 00 in order to avoid discrimination of HIV infected people and
miseducation of the public.' Because of the problems with the
application of traditional criminal law statutes to the transmission of HIV,
the Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
96Id. at 34.
17 Schulman, supra note 34, at 959 (noting the government attempted to control
the spread of HIV by enacting laws criminalizing HIV transmission, educating the public by
installing a hotline to provide callers with information on HIV and answer questions, and
imposing tort liability for the sexual transmission of HIV).
98 Id. at 963.
" Tierney, supra note 15, at 486 (referring to HIV-specific statutes).
100 Id. at 489.
101 Id. at 487-90 (noting that only if these precautions are followed will the
criminal law be effective to punish people who engage in behavior which risks transmission
of HIV).
609
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Epidemic recommended that States adopt criminal statues specifically
tailored to HIV infection by providing "clear notice of socially
unacceptable standards of behavior specific to the HIV epidemic, and
tailor punishment to the specific crime of HIV transmission."' 12
Many States responded to the HIV/AIDS crisis by enacting
criminal statutes specific to the transmission of HIV as early as 1986.103
Other States simply relied on existing criminal statutes and applied them
to HIV. 10 4 But, "The obstacles to prosecuting HIV transmitting activities
under traditional criminal law and the inappropriateness of applying
public health statutes to AIDS" °5 clearly indicates that the enactment of
specific statutes targeted at HIV is clearly the superior method to
"establish a coercive public health response to control the spread of HIV
infection."'11
6
These statutes generally impose criminal liability on
persons who intend to infect another by committing
specific acts that are medically proven modes of
"02 Tiemey, supra note 15, at 499 (quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS & EPIDEMIC 130 (1988)).
103 See 720 ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 5/12 - 16.2 (West 1993) (making it a crime
to knowingly transmit the HIV virus to another person). Other States that have enacted
similar laws are: ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1997); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1998);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH- GEN. I § 18-601.1
(1994); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 14.15 (5210)(West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.677
(West 1996 & Supp. 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-18-112 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-20-17 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1192.1 (West 1983 & Supp. 1999).
104 See Barron, supra note 16, at 2-3 (noting that many States have applied
general criminal statutes to situations involving HIV). For example, MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 211. ll()(a) (1985) provides that a person is guilty of misdemeanor assault if that person
"attempts to cause or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another.
.. ". Section (2)(a) provides a felony penalty for aggravated assault if a person "attempts to
cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life
... ". Therefore, when applied to HIV transmission, if a person knows that he/she in infected
with HIV and engages in behavior which he or she knows is capable and likely to infect
another, that person may be guilty of aggravated assault. Donald H.J. Hermann,
Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST. Louis U. Pun. L. REv. 351, 352
(1990).
105 Kenney, supra, note 7, at 269.
106 Id.
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transmitting HIV, or who, knowing of their HIV-positive
status, commit such acts even if the intent to infect
another is absent. . . [while] also provid[ing] a defense
of consent that it met if the actors have informed their
partners of their condition and the risks involved.1
0 7
In effect, HIV-specific statutes focus on the act rather than the
result by narrowly describing the prohibited conduct and providing a
clear warning that HIV positive persons must fully warn a potential sex
partner before having sex.'08 The over- broadness of traditional criminal
statutes is eliminated by limiting the state of mind prerequisite to that of
the highest culpability while not penalizing a person for determining their
HIV status.'0 9 Further, these statutes have a stronger deterrent effect by
imposing comparative harsher penalties!'0 Finally, HIV-specific statutes
would provide for informed consent as a defense, the law would
recognize that consensual sexual conduct is the predominant means of
transmission and therefore the right to privacy given by the United States
Constitution for intimate personal contact is not as likely to be raised as
a challenge to the legislation."' Further, when in May, 1987 the
President commissioned a report on the public health dangers from the
spread of HIV," 2 the Commission found that "an HIV-specific statute
... would provide clear notice of socially unacceptable behavior specific
107 Id.
108 Id.; see also supra note 103 and accompanying text.
"o Kenney, supra note 7, at 269-70. For example, most HIV-specific statutes
require a person to knowingly or purposefully engage in behavior which risks transmission
of HIV. Id. at 270, n.161. Illinois makes it a crime to knowingly transmit the tlV virus to
another person. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38, 1 12 - 16.2 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
"' See Kenney supra note 7, at 270 (noting that the penalties invoked by HIV-
specific statutes should reflect the life threatening consequences of HIV in order to have a
deterrent effect). HIV-specific statutes provide for harsher penalties than public health
statutes. Id.
. Id. at 271. This is true because allowing for consent would enable an HIV-
specific statute to uphold constitutional privacy challenges which involve personal contact
by not penalizing an HIV infected person if their sexual partner consents to contact after
being fully informed and knowledgeable about the risks of HIV transmission. Id.
... President's Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, The Report
on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic (1988).
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to the HIV epidemic and tailor punishment to the specific crime of HIV
transmission". 13 In conclusion, "[a]n AIDS- specific statute that limits
the proscribed acts, imposes liability for only purposeful or intentional
infection, and includes a defense of consent represents the best method
to criminalize HIV transmission."' 14
There is, however, opposition to criminal statutes targeted at HIV
transmission.1 5 Some commentators believe that criminalstatutes will
not be an effective weapon to control the spread of HIV.1 6 They claim
that the statute may be almost entirely unenforceable because of the
highly private nature of sexual activity as well as the difficulty of proving
that the person had the requisite knowledge of their infection at the time
of the act. 17 Further, they claim that if the defense of consent is allowed,
the statute does not help control the spread of HIV unless it requires the
use of condoms to protect against the transmission of HIV." 8 Finally,
activity that was once legal would become illegal upon learning that one
is infected with HIV, thereby discouraging people from learning their
HIV status and thereafter entering into education and treatment
programs." 9 However, some of these concerns can adequately be
rebutted by looking into the foreseeability of harm. 2
V. WHEN KNOWLEDGE SHOULD BE IMPUTED
Foreseeability is a necessary element to be present before a court
will impose a duty to warn a sexual partner. 2' Courts usually require a
"
3 Id. at 130.
14 Kenney, supra note 7, at 271.
115 Id. at 270 (noting that criminalizing HIV transmission is controversial); see
also Schultz, supra note 75, at 113 (noting that criminalization of HIV transmission would
be "expensive, ineffective, and counterproductive").
16 Id. at 271. Commentators argue that the statute may allow for prosecution
when there is merely an attempt to infect another with HIV. Id.
"7 Id. (arguing that the court would have to subpoena medical records in order
to prove infection at the time of the act).
118 Id.
"
9Id. at 271,273.
120 Schulman, supra note 34, at 973.
121 Id. at 973.
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person to have either actual knowledge of disease or imputed knowledge
of disease in order for the harm to be foreseeable!22 A statute can impute
knowledge on a person who knows or should know of their HIV status
through the use of foreseeability.' 23 Almost all courts agree that actual
knowledge of a disease is enough to impose a duty to warn, 24 but
disagree on what is necessary to impute this knowledge on a person and
therefore impose a duty to warn. 25
A. The Rock Hudson Case
Christian v. Sheft'2 6 exemplifies the assertion that a person who
knows himself to be infected with HIV has a duty to warn a sexual
partner of the presence of disease before engaging in sexual
intercourse. 127 This was the earliest and most publicized case involving
the sexual transmission of HIV. 28 Marc Christian, Rock Hudson's lover,
brought this action seeking damages because Hudson never disclosed that
he was HIV positive to Christian while they were involved in sexual
relations. 129 The jury awarded Christian $14.5 million dollars in damages
122 Id. at 973-74.
123 Id. at 974.
124 See, e.g., Berner, 543 So.2d 686 (holding knowledge of genital herpes
imposes duty to warn sexual partner); Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Ct. App. 1990)
(genital herpes); Kathleen K. V. Robert B., 198 Cal.Rptr.564 (Ct. App. 1990) (genital
herpes); Gabriel v. Tripp, 576 So.2d 404 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991) (genital herpes); Long v.
Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (genital herpes); In re Marriage of Foran, 587
N.E.2d 570 (Ill.App.Ct. 1982) (genital warts); Meany v. Meany, 639 So.2d 229 (La. 1994)
(genital herpes and genital warts); B.N. v. K.K., 538 A.2d 1175 (Md. 1988) (genital herpes);
M.M.D. v. B.L.G., 467 N.W.2d 645 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991) (genital herpes); R.A.P. v. B.J.P.,
428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (genital herpes); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651
(Mo. 1986) (genital herpes); Crowell v. Crowell, 105 S.E.2d 206 (N.C. 1920) (venereal
disease); G.L. v. M.L., 550 A.2d 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988) (genital herpes);
Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (genital herpes); Doe v.
Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678 (N.Y.J.C. 1993) (chlamydia); Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 25
(Ohio 1989) (venereal disease); Stafford v Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14 (Tex. 1987).
125 Schulman, supra, note 34, at 974.
126 Christian v. Sheft, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Super. Ct. 1989).
1"7 Schulman, supra note 34, at 979.
128 Id.
129 Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sheft, 756 F. Supp. 449, 450 (C.D. Cal.
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because Hudson's conduct was "outrageous" . 3' The court found a duty
to warn a sex partner when a person has actual knowledge that theyare
infected with HIV. 3' However, the court did not address the question of
whether a person has a duty to warn when they do not have actual
knowledge of HIV infection.'32
In the past, courts have been reluctant to impose a duty to warn
a sexual partner because it was not reasonably foreseeable to the person
that he may have HIV because of the "scant amount of information
available about HIV-AIDS."'33 Today, however, "HIV-AIDS awareness
is at a heightened level. Thus, someone who experiences symptoms
commonly associated with HIV-AIDS, and who has previously engaged
in high risk activity should be imputed to have knowledge of the
disease,"' 34 thereby imposing a duty to warn upon the person. 135
B. The Magic Johnson Case
"Here I am saying it can happen to anybody, even me, Magic
Johnson."13 6
The more recent case involving Earvin "Magic" Johnson also
1990).
131 Id. at 450. In this case, Hudson, knowing that he had AIDS, intentionally
misrepresented that fact to Christian during the time the two were involved in sexual
relations. Id. The damages were awarded for "intentional misrepresentation, concealment,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress". Id.
'31 Since Hudson had actual knowledge of his infection, the court applied the
law based upon that state of mind. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sheft, 756 F. Supp. 449.
1 Since Hudson had actual knowledge, this question was not presented for
consideration. Id.
133 Schulman, supra note 34, at 980.
134 Id.
131 Id. A person who has knowledge of the presence of disease has a duty to
warn a sexual partner before engaging in sexual activity. See supra, note 124 for cases
upholding this principle.
136 Charles Leerhsen, Magic's Message, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 18, 1991, at 58
(stating that most people do not understand exactly what HIV/AIDS is and how it is spread,
which leads to the false assumption that they can not get infected); see also Sylvia Jung
Earnshaw, Comment, An Ounce Of Prevention Where There Is No Cure: AIDS And Public
Health In Wyoming, 27 LAND & WATER L. REv 471, 473 (1992).
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deals with HIV transmissionand also elaborates the imputed knowledge
principle.'37 In this case, the plaintiff sued Johnson for wrongful
transmission of HIV alleging that knowledge should be imputed upon
Johnson because of his promiscuous lifestyle and therefore, Johnson had
a duty to warn. 3 Although Johnson admitted he had unprotected sex
with many women, Johnson did not know of his HIV infection nor did
he have any symptoms of HIV' 3 9 The key issue was whether Johnson's
level of knowledge of HIV enabled him to foresee the possibility of harm
to the plaintiff and thereby give rise to the duty to warn!4" The court also
looked at other factors such as the likelihood of transmission of HIV, the
burden on the defendant, the societal interest, the relationship of the
parties involved, and the severity of risk of transmission. 4' The court
finally held that there are three instances which give rise to a duty to
warn a sexual partner that one may have HIV: 1) actual knowledge of
HIV infection; 2) the presence of symptoms associated with HIV/AIDS;
and 3) actual knowledge that a previous sex partner is infected with
HIV. 42 The court would not impose a duty to warn solely on the basis
that a person has engaged in high risk activity by having many sex
partners, holding that "a defendant who has had unprotected sexual
encounters with multiple partners does not have a legal duty to inform a
plaintiff of his or her past sexual activity.' 43
The Johnson Court did clarify under what situations a duty to
warn a sexual partner exists. 4  Clearly one would be deemed to have
actual knowledge of HIV by either testing positive for HIV or by a
doctor's diagnosis. 14 However, it is not clear when knowledge should
"' Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (holding that
knowledge of HIV infection will not be imputed on a person solely because the person
engaged in unprotected sex with multiple partners).
138 Id. at 1385.
139 Id. at 1387.
140 Id. at 1388.
"I' Id. at 1382.
142 Doe, 817 F. Supp. at 1391-92.
143 Id. at 1393.
14 Id. at 1386, 1389-90.
145 Schulman, supra note 34, at 984. Black's Law Dictionary defines actual
knowledge as positive knowledge of a fact and for the purposes of warning another person
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
be imputed upon a person because they have constructive knowledge of
HIV.' 46 Constructive knowledge of a fact is when a person, by the
exercise of reasonable care, could have known of such a fact. 47 "By
imputing constructive knowledge of HIV-AIDS ... sexually transmitted
HIV-AIDS is subject to a greater degree of control than under the status
quo.' 48
The Johnson case holds that a person who has symptoms of
HIV/AIDS has the duty to warn one's sexual partner. 49 However, it is
necessary to define exactly what those symptoms are since the symptoms
associated with HIV/AIDS are usually not indicative of infection. 5
When a person has the obvious, serious symptoms associated with
HIV/AIDS,'5 ' then it is clear that a duty should be imposed upon that
person to warn a sexual partner.'52 However, when the symptoms are
more obscure and can possibly be attributed to another ailment, the
person should then have the duty to investigate the cause of these
symptoms before engaging in sexual intercourse.' However, it would
seem to follow that until the personfully investigates and determines the
cause of the symptoms, the duty to warn should still be imposed on them.
The Johnson case also holds that a person has the duty to warn
a sex partner if one has knowledge that a previous sexual partner has
HIV/AIDS. 5 4 This standard should be clarified to include all types of
sexual relations, including vaginal, anal, and oral sex.'55 TheJohnson
"embraces those things of which the one sought to be charged has express information".
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 873 (6th ed. 1990).
'
46 Id. at 987. For example, the Johnson Court's determination of when the duty
to warn is imposed on a person is unclear when a person learns that a previous partner is
infected with HIV and when a person merely engages in high risk activity.
147 Schulman, supra note 34, at 987.
148 Id.
14' Doe v. Johnson, 817 F. Supp. 1382.
150 Schulman, supra note 34, at 987.
151 Schulman, supra note 34, at 988 (citing obvious symptoms as substantial
weight loss, fatigue, fevers, night sweats, persistent diarrhea, enlarged lymph glands, and
other common long-term symptoms associated with HIV/AIDS).
152 Id.
'3 Id. at 989 (citing obscure symptoms as fatigue or weight loss).
15Doe, 817 F. Supp. 1382, 1393.
'15 See Schulman, supra note 34, at 990. Broadening this rule makes it clear
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Court refused to impose a duty based solely on past sexual behavior, no
matter how promiscuous or risky. 15 6 These are circumstances in which
a person does not have actual knowledge of one's HIV status and has no
reason to suspect that they have contracted HIV 57 Some commentators
feel that a duty should be imposed upon people who have been involved
in high risk activities because they present a profound risk of transmitting
HIV to their sexual partners due to their past promiscuity.' 58 However,
the Johnson Court, does not agree with that reasoning.'59 This duty
would entail foreseeing merely the possibility of disease, not the
probability or the actual presence of it.6 This would include a multitude
of people who had unprotected sex and therefore impose a duty too broad
and far reaching.' 6' Further, it would be extremely difficult to define
exactly how much risky behavior is needed and where to draw the line!62
The law would not be determinable and not forewarn a person of when
the duty arises. It would unreasonably intrude on a person's right to
privacy. 63 Further, these commentators argue that the public policy
would impose this duty on a person who has engaged in risky
behavior."6 For the same reasons, this again is too burdensome a duty
to place on a person, even given the strong public policy to prevent the
spread of HIV.
65
exactly what type of sexual intercourse is included and forecloses every possible route of
sexual transmission. Id.
156 Id. at 983.
"I Id. at 991 (stating the example of having no symptoms or no knowledge of
previous partners being infected).
'" Id. at 991. It is argued that when a person's past conduct reaches a high level
of risk for contracting HIV, a reasonable person would realize the possibility of having
contracted HIV and therefore owes a duty to a person they are about to become sexually
involved with. Id.
59 Id. at 983 (noting that the Johnson Court does not impose a duty solely based
on past conduct).
"~ Schulman, supra note 34, at 991.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
' Schulman, supra note 34, at 992.
165 Id. at 992.
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VI. "SUPERTRANSMITTERS"
To date, there have only been a few cases in which a person
infected with HIV intentionally spread the virus to a half- dozen or more
people. 66 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control labeled these individuals
"supertransmitters". 167
A. Darnell "Boss Man" McGee
In 1992, in East St. Louis, Missouri, Darnell "Boss Man"
McGee, an HIV positive man, had sex with approximately 100 women!68
thereby spreading the HIV virus to dozens of sexual partners! 69 He has
been linked to approximately 30 cases of HIV by the Missouri
Department of Health and approximately 100 HIV positive women claim
that he spread the virus to them. 70 McGee was shot and killed in January
1997 by a gunman who still has not been captured. 7'
B. Nushawn Williams
A more recent supertransmitter is a 20 year old man from New
York known as Nushawn Williams'7 2 or Shyteek Johnson,'73 among other
aliases. Williams found out over a year before his arrest' that he was
HIV-positive and claims that he had sex with at least 70-80 women
166 Id. at 8A. These cases include those of Darnell McGee and Shyteek Johnson.
Id.
167 Id. at 8A. "Supertransmitters" refers to a person who has spread HIV to
more than 6 people. Id.
168 Jim Dwyer, Carrier ofDeath, DAELY NEWS, October 28, 1997, at 7.
169 Sauerwein, supra note 87, at 8A.
170 Id.
"' Id. at 8A. Since McGee cannot be brought to trial, the courts will not have
a chance to rule on the legality of his acts. Id.
"' See Jorge Fitz-Gibbon, AIDS? A Lie, He Thought, DAELY NEWS, Nov. 4,
1997, at 21.
' See Corky Siemaszko, Say at Least 11 Infected by Bronx Man, DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 4, 1997, at 7.
"' Johnson was arrested for attempted robbery and various drug offenses. Id.
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during that time.' At least 1 1 people have been infected by Williams
and at least 17 others are known to have been exposed to HIV by him and
then had sex with at least 53 other partners.
76
Williams was arrested and held for charges unrelated to his
transmission of HIV. 177 The New York State Attorney General as well
as Governor Pataki are now discussing the possibility of criminal
prosecution for the intentional transmission of HIV. 17 However, since
New York's Public Health Statutes do not include HIV on their list of
sexually transmitted diseases, and traditional criminal laws such as
reckless endangerment do not specifically address this conduct, the effort
for criminal prosecution is hampered.
179
Only now after Williams infected dozens of women with HIV do
New York lawmakers want to enact laws directed at anyone who
deliberately infects another with HIV!8° The proposed law would create
the offense of aggravated reckless endangerment and provide for up to
15 years in prison to anyone who intentionally exposes a sexual partner
to HIV. 18' However, in order to enact this law, the HIV confidentiality
laws must be relaxed so that when someone tests positive for the virus,
victims may be notified."2 New York Health officials had to go to court
to get an unprecedented waiver of New York's confidentiality laws'1
3
under the "imminent danger" provision of Public Health Law in order to
171 Id. at 7.
176 Id. at 20.
7 Id. at 7.
78 Siemaszko, supra note 174, at 20.
7 This is because transmission of HIV is not addressed in any New York
statute. Id.
"0 Owen Moritz, Pols Want Change in HIV Privacy Law, DAILY NEWS, Nov.
4, 1997, at 21.
... Id. at 21.
182 For example, New York Law provides that HIV related information may not
be disclosed to a third party without a court order, and a court may not grant such an order
unless there is a compelling need for disclosure in a civil or criminal proceeding, a clear and
eminent danger to an innocent individual, or the person is otherwise lawfully entitled to the
information. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-90 (1989).
183 Moritz, supra note 181, at 21. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2780-90 (1989)
were enacted in 1988 to encourage treatment of diseases by providing for confidentiality.
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track down William's many sex partners who were exposed to HIV.1 4
A New York Assemblywoman made the connection between control of
STDs such as syphilis and control of HIV by stating that by enacting this
legislation "we will be able to contain this disease in the same way that
we control syphilis and other communicable diseases." 5 This legislation
would bring New York in accord with 30 other States which make it a
crime to not warn a sexual partner of the presence of HIV.'86
In response to the Williams epidemic, a Health Department
spokeswoman said, "This incident really points out how one individual
- if they do not take steps to protect others - can infect many, many
people."'8 7  The McGee epidemic demonstrates this as well. If the
enactment of HIV specific laws can deterjust one person from spreading
HIV, that one person may have been, or may have become, a
supertransmitter.
VII. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Public Health laws have constantly been challenged as an
invasion of privacy.' However, the public policy of protecting public
health clearly falls within the police powers of the States and therefore
the States have the power to legislate to control infectious diseases. 8 9
' Kimberly Schaye, Health Officials Used 'Imminent Danger' in Case, DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 4, 1997, at 20.
,8 Moritz, supra note 181, at 21.
186 Id. Other States that have enacted similar laws are: ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38,
12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd 1990); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1991); IDAHO CODE §
39-608 (1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §43.5 (West 1992); MD.HEALTH- GEN.CODE ANN. §
18-601.1 (1990); MICH.COMP.LAWS ANN. §333.5210 (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
191.677 (Vernon 1992); MONT. CODEANN. § 50-18-112 (1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
20-17 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1192.1 (West 1992); TEX. PENALCODEANN. §
22.012 (West 1991); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.021 (West 1990).
187 Schaye, supra note 185, at 20.
188 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); See also Roger
Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the
Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health Interventions in the Aids Epidemic, 82 CALIF. L.
REv. 111, 121 (1994). See also KENNETH R. WING, THE LAW AND THE PUBLIC'S HEALTH 24-
25 (4th ed., 1995).
189 Doughty, supra note 189, at 120.
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This authority of the States to enact laws to protect public healthis found
within the United States Constitution. 9 The United States Supreme
Court upheld a State's police power in Jacobson v. Massachusetts91
(without defining the limits thereof) and noted that a State has the power
to enact quarantine laws and "health laws of every description.' 92 The
court also emphasized that a State not only has the authority, but also the
duty to do so to protect society. 93 This broad discretion given to the
States is sometimes limited by requiring that the State have a legitimate
interest and be able to prove a rational relationship between that interest
and the laws enacted. 94 However, this standard is not stringent and the
State's discretion is extremely broad given the "court's recognition of the
State's crucial public health role and judicial deference to the executive
and legislative branches [in this area]."' 95 Therefore, "a court is likely to
strike down a public health measure only if it stems from an illegitimate
motivation or is demonstrably irrational and unrelated to its public health
rationales."' 96 Every State has used its police power in some way to
protect society from the spread of HIV.' 97 Further, even though
compulsory screening for HIV has been criticized by commentators as
being unnecessarily intrusive,198 inLove v. Superior Court'99 the Court
19' U.S. CONST. amend. X, § 10. "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." Id.
'J Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11.
92 Id. at 25 (upholding a law which mandated compulsory smallpox
vaccinations).
' Id. at 29 (underscoring the duty of the States to protect the many healthy
people against the few sick people).
'94 Doughty, supra note 189, at 122 (noting that the State's discretionary
authority is still wide).
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Kenney, supra note 7, at 262. For example, by 1989 every State had enacted
AIDS legislation dealing with education, reporting or testing. Id. at 260. N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6505-b and N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 239 provide that dentists , nurses, podiatrists,
optometrists, and physicians must be educated on preventing the transmission of HIV in the
course of professional practice. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2781 provides for consent to HIV
testing and rules for release and reporting of confidential HIV related information.
' Kenney, supra note 7, at 262 (noting that HIV screening was criticized
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs.
of Appeals of California upheld a mandatory statute requiring testing for
HIV.200 The statute was challenged by Love on the basis that it violated
the U.S Constitution's right to due process, equal protection, and
protection against unreasonable search and seizures. 20 ' TheLove Court
relied on Jacobson.2 and allowed the legislature a great deal of leeway
to adopt legislation to control disease.0 3 Jacobson held that controlling
the spread of disease is "a compelling State interest." 4 Jacobson found
that mandatory smallpox vaccinations were valid and stated that the
Supreme Court "has distinctly recognized the authority of a State to enact
quarantine laws and 'health laws of every description'; indeed, all laws
that... will protect the public health and the public safety."' 5 Although
Jacobson has been criticized for not complying with contemporary
theories of equal protection, due process, right to privacy, and medical
reasonableness, the Jacobson standard remains and allows legislators to
control disease through coercive measures which include
criminalization. 216 Jacobson recognized that the State public health
departments usually deal with protecting the public health of the people
by enacting regulation pursuant to the State's law, however the court
clearly stated:
according to settled principles the police power of a State
must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable
regulations established directly by legislative enactment
as will protect the public health and the public safety. It
is equally true that the State may invest local bodies
called into existence for purposes of local administration
because it is ineffective for the most part and also hampers participation in voluntary testing
as well as educational programs).
'9 Love v. Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1990).
200 Id. (upholding compulsory testing of convicted prostitutes for HIV). The
statute provided that all convicted prostitutes must be tested for HIV and counseled. Id.
2' Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660.
202 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
203 Love, 276 Cal. Rptr. 660 (allowing leeway by giving deference to the
legislature's determinations).
204 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905).
205 Id. at 26-27.
206 Kenney, supra note 7, at 263.
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with the authority in some appropriate way to safeguard
the public health and pubic safety.207
Although decided in 1905,Jacobson may be interpreted today as
indicating that specific HIV laws are the preferred constitutional way to
criminalize the intentional sexual transmission of HIV/AIDS.0 8 Since
public health laws targeted at HIV transmission would criminalize even
casual contact that poses no threat of infection, they would fail the
"Jacobson reasonableness standard for government restrictions on
personal autonomy" because they would infringe on constitutionally
protected privacy interests by being over broad.2 9 This exemplifies that
grouping curable venereal disease with incurable HIV/AIDS is
inappropriate and not constitutional; therefore, indicating the need for
specific HIV statutes criminalizing the intentional sexual transmission of
HIV/AIDS.21
0
VIII. CONCLUSION
It will be difficult to overcome the many obstacles encountered
by attempting to apply traditional criminal law statutes and public health
statutes to the intentional sexual transmission of HIV.2 " Therefore, the
solution lies in the enactment of specific HIV transmission statutes
criminalizing the intentional sexual transmission of HIV. However,
statutes alone are not enough to control the spread of HIV 22 The statute
should be looked at as one measure in the fight to control the spread of
HIV; it should educate society on the acts most likely to transmit HIV;
and it should do this by criminalizing only the most risky contact so the
public does not irrationally fear casual contact while encouraging people
207 197 U.S. at 25.
2 S Kenney, supra note 7, at 266.
209 Id.
2 10 Id.
211 Id. at 267.
2"2 Id. at 272.
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to be tested and treated for HIV.213
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